This study investigates the Peltzman effects in adopting mandatory seat belt laws in the US.
time while instruments variables are proposed to reduce the endogeneity problem. Most data were collected as part of a previous research project. The fatality rate of non-occupants, which refer to pedestrians and cyclists on the road rather than drivers and passengers in the vehicle, is chosen as the dependent variable. The Peltzman effects are identified especially in the situation when the primary enforcement is directly introduced to a state. Moreover, sensitivity analyses on seat belt laws and seat belt usage are conducted to check the robustness of the results on Peltzman effects. Furthermore, the dynamics of Peltzman effects is examined by constructing variables that represent the amount of time seat belt laws have been implemented in a state. The Peltzman effects are found to fade away over time, which could be a reason many previous studies failed to identify the Peltzman offsetting effects caused by seat belt laws.
INTRODUCTION
Traffic accidents have become a major source of fatalities and serious injuries in the modern society. For example, in the US, Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) reported 30,196 fatal crashes in 2010, and on average every 16 minutes a person was killed by these crashes. The seat belt is considered an effective measure to reduce the severity of injuries and the number of fatalities. As early as the 1970s, many countries all over the world started to adopt mandatory seat belt laws, such as Australia, France, Sweden, and Singapore.
In the US, New York was the first state to introduce seat belt legislation in 1984, and now all states except New Hampshire require by law for drivers to wear seat belts while operating motor vehicles.
In those states that adopted seat belt laws, there are two types of enforcements: the primary enforcement allows the police to stop and fine violators, while the secondary enforcement allows the police to fine violators only when they are stopped for the violation against some other primary laws. Some states upgraded their seat belt laws from secondary to primary enforcements in 1990s.
As the seat belt laws become widely accepted, many studies have focused on the effects of seat belt usage on highway safety. For example, based on a laboratory survey in 1980s, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) reported that the front seat belt use could prevent 40-50% of the fatalities (Cohen and Einav, 2003) . Evans (1986) estimated a similar value of fatality reduction, (41 ± 3)%, by analyzing data of passenger cars with the model year 1974 or later in the US. Levitt and Porter (2001) found that wearing a seat belt could reduce the probability of death by approximately 60%. Ratnayake (2007) conducted a research in Kansas and indicated that wearing a seat belt could also reduce the likelihood of injuries by 44-69% in addition to saving lives.
The effectiveness of seat belt use in protecting drivers and passengers has been well established.
However, according to the Peltzman offsetting effect theory, mandatory seat belt laws make drivers feel more secure and drive more aggressively (some researchers have referred to this as 'careless'), which could cause additional crashes and fatalities. Compared to occupants (i.e., drivers and passengers), nonoccupants (i.e., pedestrians and cyclists) are more vulnerable to the Peltzman effects because they are not protected by seatbelts but only exposed to more aggressive driving behaviors. To this end, mandatory seat belt laws could potentially raise an equity problem among road users by protecting occupants but increasing the possibility of non-occupants being involved in traffic accidents, especially when occupants have higher incomes and social statuses than non-occupants.
Unfortunately, the Peltzman effects of mandatory seat belt laws on non-occupants have not received enough attention because they are often sheltered by the protection functions of seat belts. The objective of this study is not to question the effectiveness of seat belts in vehicles in reducing injuries/fatalities in the event of a crash, but to investigate the existence and dynamics of the Peltzman effects in adopting a new traffic law in the US, so that the benefit of those more vulnerable road users such as non-occupants could be better protected when new transport policies/laws are introduced.
LITERATURE REVIEW
When testing the Peltzman effects, previous studies have produced mixed results. Based on experiments, Streff and Geller (1988) confirmed the Peltzman effects: drivers tended to drive faster when they wore seat belts. Garbacz (1991) conducted an empirical study using the data in New Zealand from 1960 to 1985. His study suggested that seat belt laws resulted in more dangerous drivers and killed more cyclists and pedestrians. McCarthy (1999) stated that the seat belt law deteriorated highway safety through an analysis on a set of panel data in California from 1981 to 1989. Specifically, the dummy variable of the seat belt law had a positive coefficient in estimating fatalities in incorporated cities within metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Derrig et al. (2002) concluded that primary enforcement laws could increase higher seat belt usage rate, but the seat belt usage was not associated with fatality reductions.
Using panel data that contains 50 US states and the District of Columbia for the years 1983 to 1997, Cohen and Einav (2003) estimated a simple linear equation, with non-occupant fatalities as the dependent variable and the seat belt usage as one of the explanatory variables. The coefficient of the seat belt usage was positive, but it became negative when the state effects were fixed. Carpenter and Stehr (2008) provided a comprehensive assessment of the effects of mandatory seatbelt laws on high school age youths based on multiple data sources in the US from 1991 to 2005. Their results showed that mandatory seat belt laws effectively increased seat belt use and reduced fatalities and crash-related serious injuries. Sen and Mizzen (2007) estimated that mandatory seat belt laws could reduce 17% of traffic fatalities by using data in Canada between 1980 and 1996. When analyzing behaviors of those drivers who were involved in traffic accidents, Bae (2011) developed a dummy variable to represent careless driving behaviors and showed that the primary enforcement of seat belt usage could reduce careless behaviors. Nicita and Benedettini (2012) investigated the offsetting effects of introduction of a new enforcement mechanism in Italy and found that seat belt usage could generate additional fatalities for non-occupants.
In summary, one major reason previous studies have produced mixed results is that they focused on different study objectives. For one thing, in response to the introduction of seat belt laws, drivers from different countries have different driving behaviors (Garbacz, 1991; Sen and Mizzen, 2007; Nicita and Benedettini, 2012) . For another, those studies in the US investigated different groups of people; for example, drivers in California (McCarthy, 1999) , high school age youths (Carpenter and Stehr, 2008) , college students (Streff and Geller, 1988) , and those people who were involved in traffic accidents (Bae, 2011) . From these studies, it is still not clear whether the Peltzman effects existed in general when the seat belt laws were introduced in the US. This study uses a set of panel data containing 50 US states and the District of Columbia for the years from 1983 to 1997. A second reason many previous studies did not support the Peltzman effects is that they did not separate from the total fatalities those non-occupant ones. Only non-occupant fatality rates are the effective measure for assessing the Peltzman effects because seat belt laws have both negative and positive impacts on occupant fatality rates. On the one hand, seat belt laws reduce occupant fatality rates due to the protection function of seat belts; on the other hand, seat belt laws could increase occupant fatality rates according to the Peltzman effects. The negative impact on occupant fatality rates is usually greater than the positive counterpart, so the Peltzman effects are sheltered. However, the Peltzman effects should not be ignored in studying non-occupant fatalities because the possible impact of seat belt laws on non-occupant fatality rates can only be positive. For this reason, this study focuses only on the nonoccupant fatality rate as the dependent variable.
In addition, the Peltzman effects are underestimated when most previous studies did not address the effect dynamics. In the context of seat belt laws, The Peltzman effects work through human psychology, so they are expected to fade away when people get used to the new laws. If the time window after the seat belt laws took effect is set too large in the analysis, the Peltzman effects could be underestimated. To this end, this study also investigates the dynamics of the Peltzman effects after the seat belt law took effect.
DATA AND METHOD
Most data used in this study come from Cohen and Einav (2003) . Cohen and Einav provided a set of panel data containing 50 US states and the District of Columbia for the years from 1983 to 1997. Table   1 summarizes the variables used in this study and the corresponding data sources. The correlation of each variable with fatality is also provided. The analyses are performed in three steps.
First, to evaluate the Peltzman effects, the regression is conducted with the non-occupant fatality rates as the dependent variable. The penal data technique, fixed effect, is employed. A process of employing fixed effect can be simply described in Eqs. (1) - (3), while the detailed explanation can be found in Wooldridge' book (Wooldridge, 2012) . The formulation in Eq. (3) is used to perform regression analysis. 
where "~" means time-demeaning; for example,
where ".." means state-demeaning; for example,
Fixed effects of both year and state are proposed to minimize the regression errors caused by time-specific macro effects and state characteristics. For example, the time macro effect could be a result of the development of vehicle technology and the passage of other legislations over time; state characteristics that can impact fatality rates include weather, terrain, and driving culture. Compared to Cohen and Einav (2003) , the measures indicating cyclist/pedestrian exposures are introduced in this study.
Cyclist/pedestrian exposures are usually determined by the population or population density. When estimating the total distance traveled by cyclist or pedestrian (TDTCP) in a region, transportation engineers adopt the population density as an important measure (Federal Highway Administration, 1993) . However, the estimation of TDTCP in a state could be much more complicated. For example, increasing population density may not always increase TDTCP. In urban areas with high population densities, attractions are usually close to each other, meaning that people need to travel in shorter distances to reach different attractions; accordingly, TDTCP is reduced. Therefore, in addition to population density, this study introduces the square of population density in the regression. In the regression, all variables except dummies are in their logarithm forms. Second, the three dummy variables of seat belt laws (three means of introducing enforcement) are treated as instrument variables for the seat belt usage. Eq. (4) shows the formulation of regression with instrument variables. Since the variables of seat belt laws serve as instruments, the corresponding regression coefficients can be obtained by solving the system with Eqs. (5) -(7).
where ) ( E represents the expectation; and ) ( Cov represents the covariance.
This study applies the regression model with instrument variables because seat belt usage is endogenous (Kim and Washington, 2006) ; for example, dangerous road conditions, such as wet surfaces caused by rains, high speed road segments, and abrupt curves, not only make people more likely to wear seat belts but also lead to more accidents and fatalities. On the other hand, Cohen and Einav (2003) argued that the seat belt laws were exogenous: there might be a concern that states tended to pass seat belt laws when facing high fatality rates, but such a concern became much less important once both year and state fixed effects are used.
Third, the reduced form of the second step analysis for fatalities is presented. The reduced form is relatively simple, as shown in Eq. (8).
This third model is proposed for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretically, such a reduced form is usually used to examine the impact of policies on outcomes (Wooldridge, 2012) .
Empirically, the seat belt laws could be correlated with non-occupant fatalities, so the variables of seat belt laws -the three dummies of enforcement types -should be treated as explanatory variables. Even if the passage of laws is not a result of high fatality rates but a political process, the implementation of laws can impact fatalities through different channels other than the seat belt usage; for example, when the law takes effect, many drivers always think they wear seat belts, but sometimes they forget to do so. In this situation, these drivers do not increase seat belt usage, but they still feel safer and are likely to kill more non-occupants. Table 2 summarizes regression results using different models. The first column reports OLS regressions with both year and state fixed effects [Note: ideally, one should have used a count data model, as discussed by Lord and Mannering (2010) , but such data were not available. However, given the size of the sample, the OSL can still be used effectively]. All variables have been used or suggested in previous studies when addressing the similar question on seat belt laws and fatalities (e.g., Cohen and Einav, 2003; Ratnayake, 2007; Sen and Mizzen, 2007; Nicita and Benedettini, 2012) . The coefficient on usage is negative at the significant level of 0.05, meaning that the higher usage the less non-occupant fatalities.
RESULTS
However, the coefficient on dp, the implementation of primary enforcement, is positive at the significant level of 0.01. This positive coefficient indicates the Peltzman effects, meaning that the implementation of primary enforcement leads to a greater non-occupant fatality rate. One possible problem to this conclusion is the endogeneity of the usage variable, so the second column treats the three dummy variables of enforcement types as instrument variables for usage. The coefficient on usage is still negative, although it is not significantly different from zero. The third column further presents the reduced form for fatalities. Again, the coefficient on dp is significantly positive, yet the significant level becomes 0.10. Therefore, based on the above analysis of all three columns, the Peltzman effects are identified, especially when the primary enforcement is directly introduced to a state.
In addition to seat belt usage and seat belt laws, other control variables are discussed. The coefficients of control variables are almost the same in the first and the second columns, but the coefficients of many control variables change significantly from the second column to the third. It implies either that the usage is a critical variable in the regression model, or that the usage is strongly endogenous.
The income and unemployment rate are two important indices for economy. In all three models coefficients on unemployment rate are negative, suggesting that fatalities are less during bad economic situations. One partial reason is that people drive more during economic prosperity (Ruhm, 2000) ; a second reason may be that people more appraise their time and drive faster during the same period (Cohen and Einav, 2003) . In addition, the third column produces the significantly positive coefficient on income, which supports the results regarding the impact of economic situations on fatalities. On the other hand, the negative coefficients on income produced by the first two columns imply that the first two models could be less accurate than the third one.
Mean age, % African Americans, and % Hispanics are three demographic control variables in this study. Generally, the mean age has a positive coefficient, suggesting older drivers/passengers to be associated with traffic fatalities. It is known that older drivers have greater difficulties with the driving task (e.g., visual search, reaction time, etc.) than younger drivers (Dewar, and Olson, 2007; Shinar, 2008) ; for another, older people are more likely to be fatally injured as a result of a traffic accident. To evaluate the robustness of this effect of age on fatalities, we ran additional regression analyses by replacing the mean age with the percentages of populations at 0-24 and 65+. The coefficients for the percentage of 0-24 were negative while the percentage of 65+ were positive, and only the coefficients for the percentage of 65+ were significant. Coefficients on % Hispanics are insignificant, while coefficients on % African are significantly negative. This implies that African American are less likely to be involved in fatal traffic accidents, which is against conventional perspectives. However, without state fixed effects, the coefficient for African Americans is positive and significantly different from zero, which may imply that they are more likely to live in those states with poor roadway conditions, as an example. Considering state fixed effect leads this study to generate results against conventional perspectives.
Rural and urban VMTs are control variables for traveling characteristics. In all three models, the rural VMT has significant and negative coefficients, but the coefficients for urban VMT are much less significant. This means that the non-occupant fatality rate is lower in states with a greater rural VMT when holding all other variables unchanged. One reason could be that there are more pedestrians/cyclists on urban than on rural highways.
The variables of fuel tax, 65 mph, 70 mph, MLDA 21, and BAC 0.08 control the local policies.
All these variables have insignificant impacts on fatalities except for the 70 mph speed limit. The 75-mph speed limit and above has a positive coefficient, indicating that driving faster causes more fatalities.
The coefficient on PopDen is positive, while the coefficient on PopDen Squared is negative. The effect of population density on fatalities is described by a convex parabolic curve; as the population density increases, fatalities decrease at first but increase later.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
The previous section has identified the Peltzman effects, especially when the primary enforcement is directly introduced to a state. To test the robustness of this outcome, this section documents the sensitive analyses on two critical explanatory variables for fatalities, seat belt laws and seat belt usage. Both variables involve measurement errors: dummy variables (0 or 1) representing seat belt laws are assigned to a year, but some state laws took effect in the middle of a year; some state offices tend to report higher usage in order to receive more federal funding (Cohen and Einav, 2003) .
To perform the sensitivity analyses associated with seat belt laws, four cases (artificially creating dummy variables) were proposed in addition to the base case that is used in the previous section (see Table 3 ). When the seat belt law is implemented in the middle of year T, the base case assigns zero to the dummy if the implementation time is in January -June and one otherwise. Compared to the base case, the first case produces positive errors, and the second case negative errors. In the third case, a proportion instead of a dummy is assigned, which is equal to the number of months the law is implemented divided by 12. In the fourth case, the data element in year T is taken off from the database.
To perform the sensitivity analyses related to seat belt usage, three variables (V1, V2, and V3) were randomly generated on the domain [0, 1) for each seat belt usage data, as explained in Table 4 .
Cohen and Einav found that the differences in seat belt usage data between state Highway Safety Office and NHTSA were not more than 2% in 95% of the cases (Cohen and Einav, 2003) . To this end, the first random variable is used to determine the level of measurement errors, the second the absolute value of errors, and the third the sign of errors. Ten sets of random variables are generated to produce ten cases of seat belt usage data with different measurement errors.
The previous section has provided three regression models. However, according to their characteristics, Models 1 and 3 are used to perform sensitivity analyses on seat belt laws because only in these two the variables of seat belt laws directly account for fatalities. Furthermore, only Model 1 can be used when sensitivity analyses consider seat belt usage as well. Table 5 summaries the regression results when different cases of dummy variables for seat belt laws are applied to Model 3. Table 5 only shows the coefficients for seat belt laws, though the regression includes all other control variables that have been discussed in Table 2 . For Cases 1, 2 and 3 in Table 5 , the Peltzman effects are even more notable because all coefficients on dsp become significant and some coefficients on dp have the P-values smaller than 0.05. In addition to P-Values, the magnitude of coefficients shows the same conclusion, because the coefficients on dp are around 0.0850, which is 15% larger than the estimated values shown in Table 2 .
For Case 4, all coefficients are insignificant, which, however, could be only a result of the reduced data size. Because the coefficient on dp is the most important evidence for the Peltzman effects, Table 6 only provides coefficients on dp when different cases of variable constructions for seat belt laws and seat belt usage are applied to Model 1. Because the errors for seat belt usage are randomly generated, different cases of variables of seat belt usage hardly change the coefficients on dp. According to Table 5 and Table 6 , the Peltzman effects are still notable when measurement errors of seat belt laws and seat belt usage are considered.
DYNAMICS OF THE PELTZMAN EFFECTS
In the previous two sections, the Peltzman effects have been identified, and their robustness tested.
One possible reason many previous studies did not show the Peltzman offsetting theory is that they ignored the dynamics of effects, i.e., the Peltzman effects tend to fade away over time after seat belt laws take effect. For example, in a state where seat belt laws have been introduced for many years, most drivers are used to those laws and wearing seat belts, so those laws and wearing seat belt do not impact their behavior. In particular, many new or young drivers learn to drive after seat belt laws take effect, so their behaviors cannot reflect the Peltzman effects. Therefore, this section examines the dynamics of Peltzman effects by constructing variables that represent the amount of time seat belt laws have been implemented. Table 7 presents results on dynamics of Peltzman effects. Only Model 1 and 3 are considered because in these two models the variables of seat belt laws directly account for fatalities. The previous sections have shown that among all three coefficients associated with seat belt laws the one for dp is most significant, so this section only uses data in those states where the primary enforcement was directly implemented. There are eight of them (CT, HI, IA, NC, NM, NY, OR, and TX). Four dummy variables were constructed to represent the amount of time seat belt laws have been implemented. For example, dp_y2_4 represents the time period of 2~4 years after the laws take effect. Dummy variables for the very first year after the laws take effect are not considered in this section, because they are not accurate according to the discussion in sensitivity analyses. Table 7 only shows the coefficients of seat belt usage and seat belt laws, though the regression models include all other control variables that have been discussed in Table 2 .
Due to the small size of the data set, all coefficients in Table 7 are insignificant; however, the dynamics of Peltzman effects can still be detected by tracking the change of coefficients of dummy variables from dp_y2_4 to dp_y11_. Generally, the coefficients keep decreasing with time from positive to negative values. This change in the value of the coefficients indicates that the Peltzman effects could be notable just after seat belt laws are implemented but tend to disappear with time.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
This study investigated the Peltzman effects in adopting mandatory seat belt laws in the US.
Using previously published data, a set of panel data containing 50 US states and the District of Columbia for the years from 1983 to 1997 is analyzed using such panel data techniques as fixed effects and instrument variables. The non-occupant fatality rate is chosen as the dependent variable. The Peltzman effects were identified especially in the situation when the primary enforcement is directly introduced to a state. That is, seat belt laws make drivers feel more secure and drive careless, leading to additional crashes and fatalities. Although seat belts can protect occupants (i.e., drivers and passengers), these crashes and fatalities kill more non-occupants (i.e., pedestrians and cyclists). The regression analyses not only identified the Peltzman effects, but also provided many interesting results on other control variables: fatalities occur less frequently during economic downturns (or recessions); older drivers/passengers are more likely to be involved in fatal traffic crashes; the non-occupant fatality rate is lower in a state with a larger rural VMT; population density is an important explanatory variable for non-occupant fatalities (more people walk/bike as a transportation mode).
Moreover, to examine the robustness of the results on the Peltzman effects, this study documented sensitivity analyses and the dynamic characteristics of the Peltzman effects. Sensitivity analyses were conducted for two critical explanatory variables, namely the seat belt laws and seat belt usage, because both two involve measurement errors. The Peltzman effects were still identified when measurement errors are considered. In addition, the dynamics of Peltzman effects was examined by constructing variables that represent the amount of time seat belt laws have been implemented. The Peltzman effects were found to fade away over time. This dynamics could a possible reason many previous studies did not support the Peltzman offsetting theory.
This study revealed the Peltzman effects in adopting seat belt laws, but such effects should exist when some other transportation policies/laws are implemented. For example, future research can investigate the Peltzman effect caused by implementing antilock brakes, wearing bicycle helmets, or reducing speed limits. Moreover, we found that directly implementing the primary enforcement had more significant Pelzman effects compared with moving from secondary to primary enforcement; therefore, more attention should be paid on developing smoother policies to weaken Peltzman effects and to improve transportation safety accordingly (for other users that could be affected by this phenomenon). 
